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ABSTRACT
Current approaches of enforcing FGAC in Database Man-
agement Systems (DBMS) do not scale in scenarios when
the number of policies are in the order of thousands. This
paper identifies such a use case in the context of emerg-
ing smart spaces wherein systems may be required by leg-
islation, such as Europe’s GDPR and California’s CCPA,
to empower users to specify who may have access to their
data and for what purposes. We present SIEVE, a layered
approach of implementing FGAC in existing database sys-
tems, that exploits a variety of it’s features such as UDFs,
index usage hints, query explain; to scale to large number of
policies. Given a query, SIEVE exploits it’s context to filter
the policies that need to be checked. SIEVE also generates
guarded expressions that saves on evaluation cost by group-
ing the policies and cuts the read cost by exploiting database
indices. Our experimental results, on two DBMS and two
different datasets, show that SIEVE scales to large data sets
and to large policy corpus thus supporting real-time access
in applications including emerging smart environments.
1. INTRODUCTION
Organizations today capture and store large volumes of
personal data that they use for a variety of purposes such
as providing personalized services and advertisement. Con-
tinuous data capture, whether it be through sensors embed-
ded in physical spaces to support location-based services
(e.g., targeted ads and coupons), or in the form of web
data (e.g., click-stream data) to learn users’ web browsing
model, has significant privacy implications [6, 7, 36]. Regu-
lations, such as the European General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) [3], California Online Privacy Protection
Act (CalOPPA) [2] and Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [1],
have imposed legislative requirements that control how or-
ganizations manage user data. These requirements include
transparency about data collection, data minimization (both
volume of data stored and duration of its retention), data re-
tention (that requires personal data to be kept for no longer
than is necessary for the purposes for which it is being pro-
cessed), etc. A key requirement for organizations/services to
collect and to use individual’s data, is to adopt the principle
of choice and consent [23]1. Until today, this requirement
resulted in supporting mechanisms which allow users to opt-
in/out and/or to specify data retention policies.
1Currently, such organizations typically follow the principle
of notice wherein they inform the user about data collection,
but may not support mechanisms to seek consent.
While such coarse level policies have sufficed for the web
domain, recent work argued that as smart spaces become
pervasive wherein sensors continuously monitor individuals
(e.g., continuous physiological monitoring by wearable de-
vices, location monitoring both inside and outside build-
ings), systems will need to empower users with finer control
over who can access their data and for what purpose. Sup-
porting such fine grained policies raises several significant
challenges that are beginning to attract research attention.
These challenges include policy languages suitable for rep-
resenting data capture, processing, sharing and retention
policies [31] together with mechanisms for users to spec-
ify their policies within the system. This paper addresses
one of such challenges: scaling enforcement of access control
policies in the context of database query processing when
the set of policies become a dominant factor/bottleneck in
the computation due to their large number. This has been
highlighted as one of the open challenges for Big Data man-
agement systems in recent surveys such as [17].
In the envisioned system that drives our research, data is
dynamically captured from sensors and shared with people
via queries based on user-specified access control policies.
We describe a motivating use case of a smart campus in
Section 2.1 which shows that data involved in processing a
simple analytical query might require checking against hun-
dreds to thousands of access control policies. Enforcing that
many access control policies in real-time during query exe-
cution is well beyond database systems today. While our
example and motivation is derived from the smart space
and IoT setting, the need for such query processing with
a large number of policies applies to many other domains.
Especially, as argued before, for emerging legislatures such
as GDPR that empower users to control their data.
Today, database management systems (DBMSs) imple-
ment Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC) by one of two
mechanisms [8]: 1) Policy as schema and 2) Policy as data.
In the former case, access control policies are expressed as
authorization views [33]. Then, the DBMS rewrites the
query and executes it against the relevant views instead of
the original data. These views allow administrators to con-
trol access to a subset of the columns and rows of a table. In
the latter case, policies are stored in tables, just like data.
The DBMS rewrites queries to include the policy predicates
prior to execution [5, 9, 13, 15]. This mechanism allows ad-
ministrators to express more fine-grained policies compared
to views. Existing DBMS support both mechanisms, as they
are both based on query rewriting [35], by appending poli-
cies as predicates to the WHERE clause of the original query.
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However, they are limited in the complexity of applications
they can support due to the increased cost of query execu-
tion when the rewriting includes a large number of policies
(e.g., appending 1K policies to a query might result in 2K
extra predicates in the WHERE clause if each policy contains
two conditions). Thus, scalable access control-driven query
execution presents a novel challenge.
In this paper, we propose SIEVE, a general purpose mid-
dleware to support access control in DBMS that enables
them to scale query processing with very large number of ac-
cess control policies. It exploits a variety of features (index
support, UDFs, hints) supported by modern DBMSs to scale
to large number of policies. A middleware implementation,
layered on top of existing DBMS, allows us to test SIEVE in-
dependent of the specific DBMS. This is particularly useful
in our case (motivated by IoT) since different systems of-
fer different trade-offs in IoT settings as highlighted in [19].
The comparative simplicity of implementing the technique
in middleware makes it simpler to implement yet another
advantage - it allows us to explore the efficacy of different
ideas instead of being constrained by the design choice of a
specific system as shown in previous work such as [14].
SIEVE incorporates two distinct strategies to reduce over-
head: reducing the number of tuples that have to be checked
against complex policy expressions and reducing the num-
ber of policies that need to be checked against each tuple.
First, given a set of policies, it uses them to generate a set
of guarded expressions that are chosen carefully to exploit
best existing database indexes, thus reducing the number
of tuples against which the complete and complex policy
expression must be checked.
The technique for predicate simplification developed in
Chaudhuri et al. [11] inspired our guard selection algorithm
presented in this paper. The second strategy is inspired
by pub-sub approaches such as [34, 18, 39, 22]. Using this
strategy, SIEVE reduces the overhead of dynamically check-
ing policies during query processing by filtering policies that
must be checked for a given tuple by exploiting the context
present in the tuple (e.g., user/owner associated with the
tuple) and the query metadata (e.g., the person posing the
query i.e,. querier or their purpose). We define a policy
check operator ∆ for this task and present an implementa-
tion as a User Defined Function (UDF).
SIEVE combines the above two strategies in a single frame-
work to reduce the overhead of policy checking during query
execution. Thus, SIEVE adaptively chooses the best strat-
egy possible given the specific query and policies defined for
that querier based on a cost model estimation. We evaluate
the performance of SIEVE using a real WiFi connectivity
dataset captured in our building at UC Irvine, including
connectivity patterns of over 40K unique devices/individu-
als. We generate a synthetic set of policies that such indi-
viduals could have defined to control access to their data
by others. Our results highlight the benefit of the guarded
expressions generated by SIEVE when compared to the tra-
ditional query rewrite approach for access control. Further-
more, our results show the efficiency achieved by SIEVE
when processing different queries.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 presents a case study
of a real IoT deployment, where a large set of access con-
trol policies are expected to be defined, and reviews the
relevant related works. Section 3 formalizes the query, pol-
icy model, and the access control semantics of SIEVE. Sec-
tion 4 presents an algorithmic solution to generate appropri-
ate guarded expressions, the building block of SIEVE. Sec-
tion 5 describes how SIEVE can be implemented in current
databases. Section 6 describes how SIEVE deals with dy-
namic scenarios in which the access control policy set gets
updated. Section 7 presents our experimental evaluation
using a real dataset involving thousands of real individuals.
Finally, Section 8 presents conclusions and future work.
2. PROBLEM SETTING
We present a case study based on a smart campus setting
where there are a large number of FGAC policies specified
by users on their collected data. Using this context, we
review the related work and show they fall short in terms of
managing and enforcing these large number of policies.
2.1 Smart Campus Case Study
We consider a motivating application wherein an aca-
demic campus supports variety of smart data services such
as real-time queue size monitoring in different food courts,
occupancy analysis to understand building usage (e.g., room
occupancy as a function of time and events, determining
how space organization impacts interactions amongst oc-
cupants, etc.), or automating class attendance and under-
standing correlations between attendance and grades [21].
While such solutions present interesting benefits, such as im-
proving student performance [21] and better space utiliza-
tion, there are privacy challenges [32] in the management
of such data. This case study is based on our experience
building a smart campus with variety of applications rang-
ing from real-time services to offline analysis over the past
4 years. The deployed system, entitled TIPPERS [29], is
in daily use in several buildings in our UC Irvine campus2.
TIPPERS at our campus captures connectivity events (i.e.,
logs of the connection of devices to WiFi APs) that can
be used, among other purposes, to analyze the location of
individuals to provide them with services.
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Figure 1: Entities and relationships in a Smart Campus Scenario.
We use the UC Irvine campus, with the various entities
and relationships presented in Figure 1 (along with the ex-
pected number of members in brackets), as a use case. Con-
sider then a professor in the campus posing the following
analytical query to evaluate the correlation between regular
attendance in her class vs. student performance at the end
of the semester:
StudentPerf(WifiDataset , Enrollment , Grades)=
(SELECT student , grade , sum(attended)
FROM (
SELECT W.owner AS student , W.ts-date AS date ,
count (*)/count (*) AS attended
2More information about the system and the applications
supported at http://tippersweb.ics.uci.edu
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FROM WiFiDataset AS W, Enrollment AS E
WHERE E.class="CS101" AND E.student=W.owner AND W.
ts-time between "9am" AND "10am" AND W.ts -date
between "9/25/19" AND "12/12/19" AND W.wifiAP
="1200"
GROUP BY W.owner , W.ts-date) AS T, Grades AS G
WHERE T.student=G.student
GROUP BY T.student)
Let us assume that within the students in the professor’s
class, there exist different privacy profiles (as studied in the
mobile world by Lin et al. [27]). Adapting the distribution
of users by profile to our domain, we can assume that 20% of
the students might have a common default policy (”uncon-
cerned” group), 18% may want to define their own precise
policies (”advance users”), and the rest will depend on the
situation (for which we consider, conservatively, 2/3 to be
”unconcerned” and 1/3 ”advance”). Simplifying this and
applying it to a class of 200 students, we have 120 un-
concerned users who will adopt the default policy and 80
advanced users who will define their own set of policies.
With the conservative assumption, that there are two de-
fault policies per default user and at least 4 specific policies
per advanced user, we have a total of 560 policies. Typically
advanced users define more policies than this conservative
assumption so if we were to add two additional policy per
group which will increase the number of policies to 880, or
1.2K (with three additional policies per group).
Given the above policies for a single class, if students
take 1-6 classes and faculty teach 1-4 classes per semester,
a query to analyze students attendance listed above with
performance over classes a professor taught over the year
would be 3.3K (560 policies/class * 2 classes/quarter * 3
quarters/year) to 7.2K (considering our 1.2K policies/class
estimation). We only focused on a single data type captured
in this analysis (i.e., connectivity data) with two conditions
per policy (e.g., time and location), and policies defined by a
given user at the group-level (and not at the individual-level,
which will even further increase the number of policies).
The case study above motivates the requirements for emerg-
ing domains, such as smart spaces and IoT, on scalable ac-
cess control mechanisms for large policy sets that the DBMS
must support. While our example and motivation is derived
from the smart space and IoT setting, the need for such
query processing with a large number of policies applies to
many other domains. Especially, as argued in the introduc-
tion, for emerging legislatures such as GDPR that empower
users to control their data. Additionally, a recent survey on
future trends for access control and Big Data systems made
a similar observation about the open challenge to scale pol-
icy enforcement to a large number of policies [17].
2.2 Related Work
As discussed in the comprehensive survey of access con-
trol in databases in [8], techniques to support FGAC can be
broadly classified as based on authorization views (e.g., [33]
and Oracle Virtual Private Database [28]) or based on stor-
ing policies in the form of data (e.g., Hippocratic databases [5]
and the follow up work [26, 4]). In either of these ap-
proaches, input queries are rewritten to filter out tuples for
which the querier does not have access permission. This is
done by adding conditions to the WHERE clause of the query
as 〈query predicate〉 AND (P 1 OR ... OR P n) (where each
Pi above refers to the set of predicates in each policy) or by
using case-statement and outer join. Both strategies cur-
rently do not scale to scenarios with large number of policies.
The view-based approach would be infeasible given the po-
tentially large number of queriers/purposes which would re-
sult in creating and maintaining materialized views for each
of them. In the policy-as-data based approach the enforce-
ment results on computational expensive query processing.
In a situation like the one in our use case study, it results
in appending hundreds of policy conditions to the query in
a disjunctive normal form which adds significant overheads.
Prior approaches, such as [10], have further proposed aug-
menting tuples with the purpose for which they can be ac-
cessed. This reduces the overheads of policy checking at
query time and could be performed at data ingestion. Such
approaches have significant limitations in the context where
there are large number of fine-grained polices such as in the
context that motivates our work. Determining permissions
for individuals and encoding them as columns or multiple
rows can result in exorbitant overhead during ingestion, spe-
cially when data rates are high (e.g., hundreds of sensor ob-
servations per second). Additionally, pre-processing efforts
might be wasted for those tuples that are not queried fre-
quently or at all. Other limitations include: 1) Impossibil-
ity of pre-processing policy predicates that depend on query
context or information that is not known at that time of in-
sertion; and 2) Difficulty to deal with dynamic policies which
can be updated/revoked/inserted at any time (thus requir-
ing processing tuples already inserted when policies change).
Recent work [12, 14], that performs some pre-processing for
access control enforcement, limits pre-processing to policies
explicitly defined to restrict user’s access to certain queries
or to certain tables. The checking/enforcement of FGAC at
tuple level is deferred to query-time and enforced through
query rewriting as is the case in our paper.
Several research efforts focused on access control in the
context of the IoT and smart spaces. In [30], the authors
propose a policy based access control approach for sensor
data. In their context, the system receives data and their
associated policies based on queries submitted to the sys-
tem. The approach does not handle analytical queries with
policies on the arriving data. The implementation of their
approach requires significant modification to existing DBMS
to make different operators security-aware for a large num-
ber of policies. In [16], the authors proposed a new architec-
ture based on MQTT for IoT ecosystems. The focus of these
works, however, is not on managing large number of poli-
cies at run time and hence, they would experience the same
issues highlighted for traditional query rewrite strategies.
3. SIEVE APPROACH TO FGAC
We describe the three fundamental entities in policy drive
data processing: data, query, and policies. For policies we
delve deeper and explain what each attribute in the policy
is for. Then using these three components we describe the
access control semantics used in this paper. We finish the
section with a sketch of the approach followed by SIEVE to
speed up policy enforcement. We have summarize frequently
used notations are summarized in Table 1 for perusal.
3.1 Modeling Policy Driven Data Processing
Data Model. Let us consider a database D consisting of
a set of relations R, a set of data tuples T, a set of indexes
I, and set of users U. Tri represents the set of tuples in the
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Notation Definition
D Database
ii ∈ I Index and set of indexes in D
ri ∈ R Relation and set of relations in D
uk ∈ U User and set of users in D
tj ∈ T; Tri ; Tuk ; TQi ;Tp
l
Tuple and set of tuples: in D; in ri;
owned by uk; required to compute Qi;
controlled by pl
group(uk) Groups uk is part of
Qi; QM
i Query; Metadata of Qi
pl ∈ P; PQMi
Access control policy and set of policies
in D; set of policies related to a query
given its metadata
ocli ∈ OCl;qcli ∈ QCl;ACl
Object conditions; querier conditions; ac-
tion of pl
E(P) = OC1 ∨ · · · ∨ OC|P| Policy expression of P
G(P) = G1 ∨ · · · ∨Gn Guarded policy expression of P (DNF ofguarded expressions)
Gi = oc
i
g ∧ PGi
Guarded expression which consists of
conjunctive expression of guard (ocig) and
a set of policies for which (ocig) is a com-
mon factor. We refer to these policies as
a policy partition (PG
i
)
CG Candidate guards for E(P)
eval(exp, tt)
function which evaluates a tuple tt
against a expression exp
∆(PG
i
, QMi, tt) policy operator
ρ(pred) estimated cardinality of a predicate
ce; cr
cost of evaluating a tuple against the set
of object conditions of a policy; cost of
reading a tuple from the disk
α
average number of policies that a tuple is
checked against before it satisfies one
Table 1: Frequently used notations.
relation ri ∈ R. Users are organized in collections or groups,
which are hierarchical (i.e., a group can be subsumed by an-
other). For example, the group of undergraduate students is
subsumed by the group of students. Each user can belong to
multiple groups and we define the method group(uk) which
returns the set of groups uk is member of. Each data tuple
tj ∈ T belongs to a uk ∈ U or a group whose access con-
trol policies restrict/grant access over that tuple to other
users. We assume that for each data tuple tj ∈ T there
exists an owner uk ∈ U who owns it, whose access control
policies restrict/grant access over that tuple to other users
(the ownership can be also shared by users within a group).
This ownership is explicitly stated in the tuple by using the
attribute ri.owner that exists for all ri ∈ R and that we
assume is indexed (i.e., ∀ ri ∈ R ∃ ij ∈ I | ij is an index
over the attribute ri.owner). Tuk represents the set of tuples
owned by user uk.
Query Model. The SELECT-FROM-WHERE query posed
by a user uk is denoted by Qi and tuples in the relations
in the FROM statement(s) of query are denoted by TQi =
n⋃
i=1
Tri . In our model, we consider that queries have as-
sociated metadata QMi which consists of information about
the querier and the context of the query. This way, we as-
sume that for any given query Qi, QM
i contains the identity
of the querier (i.e., QMiquerier) as well as the purpose of the
query (i.e., QMipurpose). In the example query in Section 2.1,
QMiquerier=“Prof.Smith” and QM
i
purpose=“Analytics”.
Access Control Policy Model. A user specifies an access
control policy (in the rest of the paper we will refer to it
simply as policy) to allow or to restrict access to certain data
she owns, to certain users/groups under certain conditions.
Let P be the set of policies defined over D such that pl ∈ P is
defined by a user uk to control access to a set of data tuples
in ri. Let that set of tuples be Tpl such that Tpl ⊆ Tuk ∩ Tri .
We model such policy as pl =〈OCl, QCl, ACl〉, where each
element represents:
• Object Conditions (OCl) are defined using a conjunctive
boolean expression ocl1 ∧ ocl2 ∧ ... ∧ ocln which determines
the access controlled data tuple(s). Each object condition
(oclc) is a boolean expression 〈attr, op, val〉 where attr is
an attribute (or column) of ri, op is a comparison operator
(i.e., =, ! =, <, >, ≥, ≤, IN, NOT IN, ANY, ALL), and val can
be either: (1) A constant or a range of constants or (2) A
derived value(s) defined in terms of the expensive operator
(e.g., a user defined function to perform face recognition)
or query on D that will obtain such values when evaluated.
To represent boolean expressions involving a range defined
by two comparison operators (e.g., 4 ≤ a < 20) we use the
notation 〈attr, op1, val1, op2, val2〉 (e.g., 〈a, ≥, 4, <, 20〉).
We assume that there exists exactly one oclc ∈ OCl such that
oclc = 〈ri.owner, =, uk〉 or oclc = 〈ri.owner, =, group(uk)〉.
We will refer to this object condition as oclowner in the rest
of the paper.
• Querier Conditions (QCl) identifies the metadata attributes
of the query to which the access control policy applies. QCl is
a conjunctive boolean expression qcl1 ∧ qcl2 ∧ · · · ∧ qclm. Our
model follows the well studied Purpose Based Access Con-
trol (Pur-BAC) model [9] to define the querier conditions.
Thus, we assume that each policy contains has at least two
querier conditions such as qclquerier = 〈QMiquerier, =, uk〉 or
qclquerier = 〈QMiquerier, =, group(uk)〉 (that defines either a
user or group), and a qclpurpose = 〈QMipurpose, =, purpose〉
which models the intent/purpose of the querier (e.g., safety,
commercial, social, convenience, specific applications on the
scenario, or any [24]). Other pieces of querier context (such
as the IP of the machine from where the querier posed the
query, or the time of the day) can easily be added as querier
conditions although in the rest of the paper we focus on the
above mentioned querier conditions.
• Policy Action (ACl) defines the enforcement operation, or
action, which must be applied on any tuple tj ∈ Tpl . We
consider the default action, in the absence of an explicit-
policy allowing access to data, to be deny. Such a model is
standard in systems that collect/manage user data. Hence,
explicit access control actions associated with policies in our
context are limited to allow. If a user expresses a policy with
a deny action (e.g., to limit the scope/coverage of an allow
policy), we can factor in such a deny policy into the explic-
itly listed allow policies. For instance, given an explicit allow
policy “allow John access to my location” and an overlap-
ping deny policy “deny everyone access to my location when
in my office”, we can factor in the deny policy by replacing
the original allow policy by “allow John access to my lo-
cation when I am in locations other than my office”. We
therefore restrict our discussions to allow policies.
Based on this policy model, we show two sample policies
in the context of the motivating scenario explained before.
First, we describe a policy with object conditions containing
a constant value. This policy is defined by John to regulate
access to his connectivity data to Prof. Smith only if he is
located in the classroom and for the purpose of class atten-
dance as follows: 〈[W.owner = John ∧ W.ts-time ≥ 09:00
∧ W.ts-time ≤ 10:00 ∧ W.wifiAP = 1200] , [Prof. Smith
∧ Attendance Control], allow〉. Second, we describe the
same policy with an object condition derived from a query
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to express that John wants to allow access to his location
data only when he is with Prof. Smith. The object condition
is updated as: [W.owner = John ∧ W.wifiAP = (SELECT W2.
wifiAP FROM WifiDataset AS W2 WHERE W2.ts-time = W.ts-
time AND W2.owner = "Prof.Smith")]
Access Control Semantics. We define access control
as the task of deriving T ′Qi ⊆ TQi which is the projection
of D on which Qi can be executed with respect to access
control policies defined for it’s querier. Thus ∀ tt ∈ TQi , tt ∈
T ′Qi ⇔ eval(E(P), tt) = True. The function eval(E(P), tt)
evaluates a tuple tt against the policy expression E(P) that
applies to Qi as follows:
eval(E(P), tt) =
{
True if ∃ pl ∈ P | eval(OCl, tt) = True
False otherwise
where eval(OCl, tt) evaluates the tuple against the object
conditions of pl as follows:
eval(OCl, tt) =
True
if ∀ oclc ∈ OCl | tt.attr = oclc.attr =⇒
eval(oclc.op,oc
l
c.val,tt.val) = True
False otherwise
where eval(oclc.op, oc
l
c.val, tt.val) compares the object con-
dition value (oclc.val) to the corresponding tuple value (tt.val)
that matches the attribute of the object condition, using the
object condition operator. If the latter is a derived value, the
expensive operator/query is evaluated to obtain the value.
Given the above semantics, the order of evaluating policies
and query predicates is important for correctness of results.
Depending upon the query operations, evaluating policies af-
ter them is not guaranteed to produce correct results. This is
trivially true in the case for aggregation or projection opera-
tions that remove certain attributes from a tuple. In queries
with non-monotonic operations such as set difference, per-
forming query operations before policy evaluation will result
in inconsistent answers.
Let P be the set of policies defined on rk that control
access to Qi. E(P) is the Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF)
expression of P such that E(P) = OC1 ∨ · · · ∨ OC|P| where
OCl is conjunctive expression of object conditions from pl ∈
P. After appending E(P) to Qi we obtain: SELECT * FROM
rj MINUS SELECT * FROM rk WHERE E(P). Consider a tuple
tk ∈ Trk which has policy pl ∈ P that denies access Qi to
tk. If there exists a tuple tj ∈ Trj such that tj = tk, then
performing set difference operations before checking policies
on rk will result in a tuple set that doesn’t include tj . On the
other hand, if policies for rk are checked first, then tk 6∈ TQi
and therefore tj will be in the query result.
This access control semantics satisfies the sound and se-
cure properties of the correctness criterion defined by [37].
If no policies are defined on tt then the tuple is not included
in T ′Qi as our access control semantics is opt-out by default.
3.2 Overview of SIEVE Approach
For a given query Qi, the two main factors that affect the
time taken to evaluate the set of policies for the set of tuples
TQi required to compute Qi (i.e., eval(E(P), tt) ∀ tt ∈ TQi)
are the large number of complex policies and the number of
tuples in TQi . The overhead of policy evaluation can thus
be reduced by first eliminating tuples using low cost filters
before checking the relevant ones against complex policies
and second by minimizing the length of policy expression a
tuple tt needs to be checked against before deciding whether
it can be included in the result of Qi or not. These two
fundamental building blocks form the basis for SIEVE.
• Reducing Number of Policies. Not all policies in P
are relevant to a specific query Qi. We can first eas-
ily filter out those policies that are defined for different
queriers/purposes given the query metadata QMi. For
instance, when Prof. Smith poses a query for grading,
only the policies defined for him and the faculty group
for grading purpose are relevant out of all policies de-
fined on campus. We denote the subset of policies which
are relevant given the query metadata QMi by PQMi ⊆ P
where pl ∈ PQMi iff QMipurpose = qclpurpose ∧ (QMiquerier =
qclquerier∨qclquerier ∈ group(QMiquerier)). In addition, for
a given tuple tt ∈ TQi we can further filter policies in PQMi
that we must check based on the values of attributes in
tt. For instance, we can further restrict the set of policies
relevant for Prof. Smith’s query by considering informa-
tion of each tuple involved in the query such as its owner
(i.e., tt.owner). This way, if the tuple belongs to John,
only policies defined by John have to be checked from
the previous set.
• Reducing Number of Tuples. Even if the number of
policies to check are minimized, the resulting expression
E(P) might still be computationally complex. We might
improve performance by filtering out tuples based on low
cost filters derived from E(P). Such processing can be
even faster if such simplified expressions could leverage
existing indexes I over attributes in the database. We
therefore rewrite the policy expression E(P) = OC1∨· · ·∨
OC|P| as a guarded policy expression G(P) which is a dis-
junction of guarded expressions G(P) = G1 ∨ · · · ∨ Gn.
Each Gi consists of a guard oc
i
g and a policy partition
PGi where PGi ⊆ P. Note that PGi partitions the set
of policies, i.e., PGi ∩ PGj = ∅ ∀ Gi,Gj ∈ G(P). Also,
all policies in P are covered by one of the guarded ex-
pressions, i.e., ∀ pi ∈ P (∃ Gi ∈ G such that pi ∈ PGi).
We will represent the guarded expression Gi = oc
i
g∧PGi
where PGi is the set of policies but for simplicity of ex-
pression we will use it as an expression where there is a
disjunction between policies.
The guard term ocig is an object condition that can sup-
port efficient filtering by exploiting an index. In partic-
ular, it satisfies the following properties:
• ocig is a simple predicate over an attribute (e.g., ts−
time > 9am) consisting of an attribute name, a com-
parison operator, and a constant value. Also, the at-
tribute in ocig has an index on it (i.e., oc
i
g.attr ∈ I).
• The guard ocig can serve as a filter for all the policies
in the partition PGi (i.e., ∀ pl ∈ PGi ∃ oclj ∈ OCl |
oclj =⇒ ocig).
As an example, consider the policy expression of all the
policies defined by students to grant the professor access to
their data in different situations. Let us consider that many
of such policies grant access when the student is connected
to the WiFi AP of the classroom. For instance, in addition
to John’s policy defined before, let us consider that Mary de-
fines the policy 〈[W.owner = Mary ∧ ∧ W.wifiAP = 1200] ,
[Prof. Smith ∧ Attendance Control], allow〉. This way,
such predicate (i.e., wifiAP=1200) could be used as a guard
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that will group those policies, along with others that share
that predicate, to create the following expression: wifiAP
=1200 AND ((owner=John AND ts-time between 9am AND 10am
OR (owner=Mary) OR ...)
SIEVE adaptively selects a query execution strategy when
a query is posed leveraging the above ideas. First, given Qi,
SIEVE filters out policies based on QMi. Then, using the
resulting set of policies it replaces any relation rj ∈ Qi by
a projection that satisfies policies in PQMi that are defined
over rj . It does so by using the guarded expression G(Prj )
constructed as a query SELECT * FROM rj WHERE G(Prj )
By using G(Prj ) and its guards ocig, we can efficiently filter
out a high number of tuples and only evaluate the relevant
tuples against the more complex policy partitions PGi . The
generation of G(Prj ) can be performed either offline before
queries arrive or even online as the algorithm (see Section 4)
is efficient for large numbers of policies (as we will show in
our experiments).
A tuple that satisfies the guard ocig is then checked against
E(PGi) = OC1 ∨ · · · ∨ OC
|PG
i
|
. As it is a DNF expression, in
the worst case (a tuple that does not satisfy any policy) will
have to be evaluated against each OCj ∈ E(PGi). We in-
troduce a policy operator (∆(PGi , QMi, tt)) which takes PGi
and each tuple tt that satisfied Gi and retrieves PˆGi , the
relevant policies to be evaluated based on QMi and tt. Then,
it performs eval(PˆGi , tt). Hence, Gi = ocig ∧ PGi will be-
come Gi = oc
i
g ∧ ∆(PGi , QMi, tt). SIEVE decides in which
situations and for which specific Gi ∈ G(Prj ) using the ∆
operator can minimize the execution cost by estimating its
cost versus the cost of eval(E(PGi), tt). The details of im-
plementation and usage of ∆ are explained in Section 5.
Hence, the main challenges are: 1) Selecting appropriate
guards and generating the guarded expression; 2) Dynami-
cally selecting a strategy and constructing a query that can
be executed in an existing DBMS, using the selected strat-
egy. We explain our algorithm to generate guarded expres-
sions for a set of policies in Section 4. This generation might
take place offline if the policy dataset is deemed to undergo
small number of changes over time. Otherwise, the genera-
tion can be done either when a change is made in the policy
table or at query time for more dynamic scenarios (our algo-
rithm is efficient enough for dynamic scenarios as we show
in Section 7). We later explain how SIEVE can be imple-
mented in existing DBMSs and how it selects an appropriate
strategy depending on the query and the set of policies.
4. CREATING GUARDED EXPRESSIONS
Our goal is to translate a policy expression E(P) = OC1 ∨
· · · ∨ OC|P| into a guarded policy expression G(P) = G1 ∨
· · · ∨Gn such that the cost of evaluating G(P) given D and
I3 is minimized
min cost(G(P),G) = min
∑
Gi∈G
cost(Gi) (1)
where G is the set of all the guarded expressions in G(P).
A guarded expression Gi corresponds to Gi = oc
i
g ∧ PGi
where ocig is an object condition on an indexed attribute.
3For our purposes we will assume that the set of available
indexes is known.
To model cost(Gi) let us define first the cost of evaluating
a tuple against a set of policies as
cost(eval(E(PGi), tt)) = α.|PGi |.ce (2)
where α represents the average number of policies in PGi
that the tuple tt is checked against before it satisfies one (as
the policies in E(PGi) form a disjunctive expression4), and
ce represents the average cost of evaluating tt against the
set of object conditions for a policy pl ∈ PGi (i.e., OCl). The
values of α and ce are determined experimentally using a set
of sample policies and tuples. Hence, we model cost(Gi) as
cost(Gi) = ρ(oc
i
g).(cr + cost(eval(E(PGi), tt))) (3)
where ρ(ocig) denotes the estimated cardinality
5 of the guard
ocig and cr represents the cost of reading a tuple from the
disk (the value of cr is also obtained experimentally). Given
this cost model, the number of policies in PGi and selectivity
of ocig contribute to most of the cost when evaluating Gi.
The first step in determining G(P) is to generate all the
candidate guards (CG), given the object conditions from P,
which satisfy the properties of guards as explained in Sec-
tion 3.2. Different choices may exist for the same policy
given I; the second step is to select a subset of guards from
CG with the goal of minimizing the evaluation cost of G(P).
4.1 Generating Candidate Guards
Each policy pl ∈ PQj is guaranteed to have at least one
object condition (i.e., oclowner), that trivially satisfies the
properties of a guard as 1) oclowner.val is a constant and
oclowner.attr ∈ I; and 2) oclowner ∈ OCl. Therefore, we first
include all the oclk in CG . Similarly, any oclc on an indexed
attribute with a constant value, belonging to any policy pl,
can be added to the candidate set CG . However, if only
those were to be used as guards, then the size of their corre-
sponding policy partitions PGi might be small as only poli-
cies defined by the same person or policies with the exact
same object condition (including, attribute, value, and op-
eration) would be grouped by such a guard. Exploiting the
property that different policies might have common object
conditions reduces the number of Gi and increases the size
of their policy partitions PGi thus decreasing the potential
number of evaluations. Hence, we create additional candi-
date guards by merging range object conditions of different
policies on the same attribute, but with different constant
values (e.g., if the conditions of two policies on attribute a
are 3 < a < 10 and 4 < a < 15, respectively, the condition
3 < a < 15 could be created as a guard, by merging the two
conditions, to group both policies in its policy partition).
The following theorem limits object conditions that should
be considered for this merge based on their overlap.
Theorem 1. Given two candidate guards ocxc = (attr
x
1 , op
x
1 ,
valx1 , op
x
2 , val
x
2 ) ∈ OCx, ocyc = (attry1 , opy1 , valy1 , opy2 , valy2) ∈
OCy such that attrx1 = attr
y
1 and attr
x
1 ∈ I, it is not benefi-
cial to generate a guard by merging them as ocx⊕yc = (attr
x
1 ,
opx1 , val
x⊕y
1 , op
y
2 , val
x⊕y
2 ) with val
x⊕y
1 = min(val
x
1 , val
y
1) and
valx⊕y2 = max(val
x
2 , val
y
2) iff [val
x
1 , val
x
2 ] ∩ [valy1 , valy2 ] = φ.
4We assume that the execution of such disjunctive expres-
sion stops with the first policy condition evaluating to true
and skipping the rest of the policy conditions.
5Estimated using histograms maintained by the database.
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Proof: By Equation 3, and considering a guarded expres-
sion that contains only a single policy pl, the evaluation cost
using oclc as guard is given by
cost(pl) = ρ(oc
l
c).(cr + ce) (4)
Given two policies px and py with candidate guards oc
x
c
and ocyc
6 such that ocxc ∩ ocyc = ∅, it is trivial to see that
the cost of evaluating their merge is always greater than
evaluating them separately. W.l.o.g., let us consider that
min(valx1 , val
y
1) = val
x
1 and max(val
x
2 , val
y
2) = val
y
2 hence
the evaluation cost if they were to be merged would be
cost(px ⊕ py) = ρ(ocx⊕yc ).(cr + ce) =
(ρ(ocxc ) + ρ(oc
y
c )).(cr + ce) + ρ(oc
e
c).(cr + 2.ce) (5)
where ocec = (attr
x
1 , op
x
1 , val
x
1 , op
y
2 , val
y
2) and hence ρ(oc
e
c) >=
0, which makes cost(px ⊕ py) >= cost(px) + cost(py).
For situations where [valx1 , val
x
2 ] ∩ [valy1 , valy2 ] 6= φ we can
derive the condition that will make merging beneficial. As
previously, let us consider w.l.o.g. that min(valx1 , val
y
1) =
valx1 and max(val
x
2 , val
y
2) = val
y
2 . If the candidate guards
were to be merged the new cost of evaluation would be given
by cost(px ⊕ py) = ρ(ocxc ∪ ocyc ).(cr + 2.ce) which, applying
the inclusion-exclusion principle, becomes
cost(px ⊕ py) = (ρ(ocxc ) + ρ(ocyc )−
ρ(ocxc ∩ ocyc )).(cr + 2.ce) (6)
Given that merging will be beneficial if cost(px ⊕ py) <
cost(px) + cost(py) and by Equations 4 and 6 we have
(ρ(ocxc ) + ρ(oc
y
c )− ρ(ocxc ∩ ocyc )).(cr + 2.ce) <
ρ(ocxc ).(cr + ce) + ρ(oc
y
c ).(cr + ce)
ρ(ocxc ).ce + ρ(oc
y
c ).ce − ρ(ocxc ∩ ocyc )(cr + 2.ce) < 0
(7)
Using inclusion exclusion principle if follows that
ρ(ocxc ∩ ocyc )
ρ(ocxc ∪ ocyc ) >
ce
cr + ce
(8)
which is the condition to be checked to merge those two
overlapping candidates. Equation 8 is checked by the func-
tion θ(ocxc , oc
y
c ) which returns oc
x⊕y
c if merging oc
x
c and oc
y
c
is beneficial and φ otherwise. ocx⊕yc is added to CG and we
maintain in a mapping structure that both px and py are
relevant to that candidate guard (this information will be
used in the second step). Given Theorem 1, θ(ocxc , oc
y
c ) is
computed only if |ocxc ∩ ocyc | 6= φ, we first order the can-
didate guards by their left range value in ascending order.
The number of checks to be done could still be high as a
candidate guard could potentially merge with another tran-
sitively. For example, given a situation where ocxc ∩ocyc 6= φ,
ocyc ∩ oczc 6= φ, and ocxc ∩ oczc = φ, which might make
θ(ocxc , oc
y
c ) 6= φ, θ(ocyc , oczc) 6= φ, and θ(ocxc , oczc) = φ, it
could be possible the transitive merge of ocxc with oc
y⊕z
c is
beneficial (i.e., θ(ocxc , oc
y⊕z
c ) = φ). We present a condition
to limit the number of checks to be performed due to such
transitive overlaps for a given a CG with candidate guards
sorted in the ascending order of their left range values.
First, we show as a consequence of Theorem 1 that transi-
tive merges will not be useful under the following condition.
6For simplification of notation in this proof we use oc
x/y
c to
denote the values in the range [val
x/y
1 , val
x/y
2 ].
Corollary 1.1. Given two candidate guards ocxc and oc
y
c ,
such that ocxc ∩ ocyc 6= φ and whose merging is not benefi-
cial (i.e., θ(ocxc , oc
y
c ) = φ), and given another candidate
guard ocy⊕zc , generated after merging oc
y
c and oc
z
c , the tran-
sitive merge of ocxc and oc
y⊕z
c will not be beneficial (i.e.,
θ(ocxc , oc
y⊕z
c ) = φ) if oc
x
c ∩ oczc = φ.
Let us consider ocxc ∩ oczc = φ. By Equation 4 and Equa-
tion 6, we calculate the cost of such a merge by
cost(px ⊕ (py⊕z)) = (ρ(ocxc ) + ρ(ocyc ) + ρ(oczc)+
ρ(ocxc ∩ ocyc ) + ρ(ocyc ∩ oczc)).(cr + 3.ce) (9)
which makes cost(px ⊕ (py ⊕ pz)) > cost(px) + cost(py) +
cost(pz) and hence θ(oc
x
c , oc
y⊕z
c ) = φ.
In addition, in the situation described in Corollary 1.1, we
can show that there is no need to merge ocxc with any other
candidate following oczc .
Corollary 1.2. Given the situation explained in Corol-
lary 1.1, let us define CˆG = CG \ {ocxc , ocyc , oczc}. For any
ocwc ∈ CˆG , the transitive merge with ocxc is not beneficial
(i.e., θ(ocxc , oc
y⊕z⊕w
c ) = φ ∀ ocwc ∈ CˆG).
As the candidate guards are sorted by their left ranges and
ocxc ∩ oczc = φ, we also have ocxc ∩ ocwc = φ. Therefore, as
shown in Corollary 1.1, the transitive merge with ocxc , oc
y
c ,
oczc , and oc
w
c will not be beneficial (θ(oc
x
c , oc
y⊕z⊕w
c ) = φ).
To summarize, the steps for generating CG from a set
of policies P are then as follows: 1) For all pl ∈ P col-
lect object conditions that satisfy guard properties by their
attribute; 2) For each such collection sort range object con-
ditions by their left range; 3) For the first candidate guard
(oc1c), verify whether the next candidate guard (oc
2
c) is such
that θ(oc1c , oc
2
c) 6= φ. In that case, merge both candidate
guards to generate oc1⊕2c which is added to CG (p1 and p2
get associated to the new merged candidate). Otherwise, if
θ(oc1c , oc
2
c) = φ, then we check oc
1
c with the following candi-
date guards until the condition in Corollary 1.1 is satisfied
and move to the next candidate guard when it does and
repeat the process.
4.2 Selecting Cost Optimal Guards
We next select the subset of guards G ∈ CG that mini-
mizes the cost according to Equation 1. The guard selection
problem can be formally stated as
min
G⊆CG
cost(G) =∑
Gi∈G
cost(Gi) ∀ pi ∈ P ∃ Gi ∈ G | pi ∈ PGi (10)
The problem of selecting G from CG such that every pol-
icy in P is covered exactly once (as this would limit the
extra checkings) can be shown to be NP-hard by reducing
weighted Set-Cover problem to it. In the weighted Set-Cover
problem, we have a set of elements E = e1, · · · , en and a set
of subsets over E denoted by S = S1, · · · , Sm with each set
Si ∈ S having a weight wi associated with it. The goal of
set cover problem is to select minSˆ⊆S
∑
Si.wi | Si ∈ Sˆ and
E =
⋃
Si∈Sˆ Si. From our guard selection problem we have
E and S equivalent to P and CG respectively. We assign
ei to Si when the corresponding pi is assigned to Gi. The
weight function wi set to cost(Gi) where the evaluation cost
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of G(Gi) is set to zero. So we have wi = |OCic|.cr. If a poly-
nomial time algorithm existed to solve this problem, then it
would solve set-cover problem too.
The evaluation cost of a policy depends on the guard it is
assigned to. We define a utility heuristic7 which ranks the
guards by their benefit per unit read cost. Without a guard,
E(P) will be evaluated by a linear scan followed by the check-
ing of E(P) as filter on top of tt ∈ TQi . The guard ocic ∈ G
reduces the number of tuples that have to be checked against
each E(PGi). The benefit of a guard captures this difference
by benefit(Gi) = ce.|PGi |.(|ri| − ρ(ocic)). Using this benefit
method, and the read cost of evaluating Gi defined earlier,
we define the utility of Gi as utility(Gi) =
benefit(Gi)
read cost(Gi)
.
Algorithm 1 uses this heuristic to select the best possible
guards to minimize the cost of policy evaluation. First, it it-
erates over CG and stores each guarded expression Gi ∈ CG
(comprised of a guard ocgi and a policy partition PGi) in a
priority queue in descending order of their utility. Next, the
priority queue is polled for the Gi with the highest utility.
If PGi intersects with another PGj ∈ CG , PGj is updated
to remove the intersection of policies and utility(Gj) is re-
computed after which the new Gj is reinserted into priority
queue in the order of its utility. The result is thus the sub-
set of candidates guards G that maximizes the benefit and
covers all the policies in P, that is, minimizes cost(G(P),G)
in Equation 10.
Algorithm 1 Selection of guards
1: function GuardSelection(CG)
2: for i in 1 · · · |CG| do
3: C[i] = cost(Gi); U[i] = utility(Gi)
4: Q← φ
5: for i in 1 · · · |CG| do
6: PriorityInsert(Q,Gi,U [i])
7: while Q is not empty do
8: Gmax = Extract-Maximum(Q); G ← Gmax
9: for each Gi in Q do
10: if PG
i
∩ PGmax 6= φ then
11: PG
i
= PG
i
\ PGmax ; Remove(Q,Gi)
12: if PG
i
6= φ then
13: B = benefit(Gi); U[i] =
B
C[i]
14: PriorityInsert(Q,Gi,U [i])
return G
5. IMPLEMENTING SIEVE
SIEVE is a general-purpose middleware that intercepts
queries posed to a database, optimally rewrites them, and
submits the queries to the underlying database on which
it is layered for execution. SIEVE rewrites queries such
that the rewritten queries can be executed efficiently to
produce query results that are compliant with the policies.
SIEVE’s rewriting is based on: (a) decreasing the policies
that have to be check per tuple and (b) reducing the num-
ber of tuples that have to be checked against policy ex-
pressions. In implementing this, SIEVE exploits the ex-
tensibility options of databases such as support for UDFs
and index usage hints. The implementation of SIEVE with
connectors for both MySQL and PostgreSQL is available at
https://github.com/primalpop/sieve.
5.1 Persistence of Policies and Guards
7Similar to the one used by [20] for optimizing queries with
expensive predicates.
To store policies associated with all the relations in the
database, SIEVE uses two additional relations, the policy
table (referred to as rP ), which stores the set of policies, and
the object conditions table (referred to as rOC), which stores
conditions associated with the policies. The structure of
rP corresponds to 〈id, owner , querier , associated -table
, purpose , action , ts -inserted -at〉, where associated -table
is the relation ri for which the policy is defined and ts
-inserted -at is the timestamp at policy insertion. The
schema of rOC corresponds to 〈policy -id, attr , op, val〉
where policy -id is a foreign key to rP and the rest of at-
tributes represent the condition oclc=〈attr, op, val〉. We em-
phasize that the value val in rOC might correspond to a com-
plex SQL condition in case of nested policies. For instance,
the two sample policies defined in Section 3.1 regulate ac-
cess to student connectivity data for Prof. Smith; they
are persisted as tuples 〈1, John , Prof.Smith , WiFiDataset
, Attendance Control , Allow , 2020 -01 -01 00:00:01〉 and 〈
2, John , Prof.Smith , WiFiDataset , Attendance Control ,
Allow , 2020 -01 -01 00:00:01〉 in rP and with the tuples 〈1,
1, wifiAP , =, 1200〉, 〈2, 1, ts-time , ≥, 09:00〉, 〈3, 1,
ts -time , ≤, 10:00〉, 〈4, 2, wifiAP , =, SELECT W2.wifiAP
FROM WiFiDataset AS W2 WHERE W2.owner = "Prof.Smith"
and W2.ts -time = W.ts-time〉 in rOC .
A guarded policy expression G(P) generated, per user and
purpose, is stored in rGE with the schema 〈id, querier ,
associated -table , purpose , action , outdated , ts-inserted
-at〉. Guarded policy expressions are not continuously up-
dated based on incoming policies as this would be unneces-
sary if their specific queriers do not pose any query. We use
the outdated attribute, which is a boolean flag, to describe
whether the guarded expression includes all the policies be-
longing to the querier. If at query time, the outdated at-
tribute associated to the guarded policy expression for the
specific querier/purpose (as specified in the query metadata
QMiquerier, QM
i
purpose) is found to be true, then that guarded
policy expression is regenerated. After the guarded expres-
sion is regenerated for a querier, it is stored in the table
with outdated set to false. Guard regeneration comes with
an overhead. However, in our experience, the corresponding
overhead is much less than the execution cost of queries. As
a result, we generate guards during query execution using
triggers in case the current guards are outdated. Guarded
expressions Gi associated with a guarded policy expression
G() are stored in two relations: rGG=〈id, guard -expression
-id , attr , op, val〉 to store the guard (i.e., ocig=〈attr, op,
val〉) and rGP=〈guard -id, policy -id〉 to store the policy
partition (i.e., PGi).
5.2 Implementing Operator ∆
We implement the policy evaluation operation ∆ (see Sec-
tion 3.2) by User Defined Functions (UDFs) on top of a
DBMS. Consider a set of policies P and the query metadata
QMi and a tuple tt belonging to relation rj . ∆(P, QMi, tt) is
implemented as the following UDF
CREATE FUNCTION delta([policy], querier, purpose, [attrs])
{BEGIN
Cursor c =
SELECT rOC .attr as attr , rOC .op as op , rOC .val as val
FROM rP , rOC
WHERE rP .querier = querier AND rP .purpose = purpose AND
rP .id IN [policy] AND rP .owner = [attrs].owner AND
rP .id = rOC .policy − id
LET satisfied_flag = true
READ UNTIL c.isNext () = false:
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FETCH c INTO p_attr , p_op , p_val
FOR each t_attr in [attrs]
IF t_attr = p_attr THEN
satisfied_flag = satisfied_flag AND /* Check
whether t_val satisfies p_op p_val */
return satisfied_flag
END}
The UDF above performs two operations: 1) It takes a
set of policies and retrieves a subset Pˆ which contains the
relevant policies to be evaluated based on the query meta-
data QMi and the tuple tt; 2) It performs the evaluation of
each policy pi ∈ Pˆ on tt.
5.3 Implementing Policy Guarded Expression
Our goal is to evaluate policies for query Qi by replacing
any relation rj ∈ Qi by a projection of rj that satisfies the
guarded policy expression G(Prj ) where Prj is the set of poli-
cies defined for the specific querier, purpose, and relation.
To this end, we first use the WITH clause for each relation
rj ∈ Qi that selects tuples in rj satisfying the guarded policy
expression8. The rewritten query replaces every occurrence
of rj with the corresponding rˆj .
WITH rˆj AS (
SELECT * FROM rj WHERE G1 OR G2 OR · · · OR Gn)
SIEVE utilizes extensibility features (e.g., index usage
hints9, optimizer explain10, UDFs) offered by DBMSs that
allows it to suggest index plans to the underlying optimizer.
Since such features vary across DBMSs, guiding optimizers
requires a platform dependent connector that can rewrite
the query appropriately. In systems such as MySQL, Ora-
cle, DB2, and SQL Server that support index usage hints,
SIEVE can rewrite the query to explicitly force indexes on
guards. For example, in MySQL using FORCE INDEX hints,
which tell the optimizer that a table scan is very expensive
and should only be used if the DBMS cannot use the sug-
gested index to find rows in the table, the rewritten query
will be as follows:
WITH rˆj AS (
SELECT * FROM rj [FORCE INDEX (oc
1
g)] WHERE G1
UNION
SELECT * FROM rj [FORCE INDEX (oc
2
g)] WHERE G2
UNION· · ·
SELECT * FROM rj [FORCE INDEX (oc
n
g )] WHERE Gn)
Some systems, like PostgreSQL, do not support index
hints explicitly. In such cases, SIEVE still does the above
rewrite but depends upon the underlying optimizer to select
appropriate indexes.
5.4 Combining ∆ with Guards
Depending upon the number of policies in the associated
guard partition (i.e., |PGi |), we could rewrite the policy par-
tition part using the ∆ operator as ∆(PGi , QMi, tt) if it re-
duces the execution cost, instead of checking the polices in-
line as shown in Section 5.3. The ∆ operator has an associ-
ated cost due to the invocation and execution of a UDF. For
8Using the above strategy the policy check needs to be only
done once in the WITH clause even if the relation appears
multiple times in the query.
9https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/
index-hints.html
10https://www.postgresql.org/docs/13/sql-explain.
html
each guarded expression Gi in a guarded policy expression
G() for a relation ri and a specific querier and purpose, we
check the overhead of using the ∆ operator (to which we will
refer to as Guard&∆) versus not using it (Guard&Inlining)
and use ∆ if cost(Guard&∆) < cost(Guard&Inlining).
We model the cost of each strategy by computing the cost
of evaluating policies per tuple since the number of tuples to
check are the same in both cases. As modeled in Equation 2,
cost(Guard&Inlining) = α.|PGi |.ce where the values of α,
the percentage of policies that have to be checked before one
returns true, and ce, the cost of evaluating a policy against
a single tuple, are obtained experimentally. We compute
α by executing a query which counts the number of policy
checks done over PGi before a tuple either satisfies one of
the policies or is discarded (does not satisfy any policy) and
averaging the number of policy checks across all tuples. We
estimate ce by computing the difference of the read cost
per tuple without policies (estimated by dividing the time it
takes to perform a table scan by the total number of tuples)
and the average cost per tuple with policies. The former is
estimated by executing a table scan with different number
of policies with different selectivities (number of tuples) and
averaging the cost per tuple per policy. cost(Guard&∆) =
UDFinv+UDFexec where the two factors represent the cost
of invocation and execution of the UDF, respectively11. We
obtain this cost experimentally by executing ∆ with varying
number of tuples (by changing the selection predicate before
∆) and the number of policies to be checked against (by
changing the guard associated with invocation of operator).
Most of the terms in both cost models are constants, the
term that varies depending on the specific guard is |PGi |.
Our experiments (see Section 7) indicate that the usage of
the Guard&∆ strategy is beneficial if |PGi | > 120.
5.5 Exploiting Selection Predicates in Queries
So far, we only considered exploiting guarded policy ex-
pressions to optimize the overhead of policy checks while
executing a query Qi. We could further exploit selection
predicates defined over relation rj that appears in Qi, es-
pecially if such predicates are highly selective, in reducing
the cost of policy checking. The rewrite strategy discussed
above, that is used to replace rj into rˆj , can be modified
to include such selective query predicates in addition to the
guarded policy expression. Such a modification provides the
optimizer with a choice on whether to use the index on the
guards or to use the query predicate to filter the tuples in
the relation on which we apply the policy checks.
Instead of depending upon the optimizer to choose cor-
rectly12, SIEVE provides a hint to the optimizer based on
estimating the cost of different possible execution strategies.
In particular, SIEVE considers the following three possibili-
ties: 1) Linear scan of the relation combined with a guarded
evaluation of the policy (referred to as LinearScan). 2) In-
dex scan based on query predicate followed by the evaluation
of the guarded policy expression (referred to as IndexQuery).
3) Index scan based on guards followed by evaluation of the
11Recent work, such as [38], shows that in some situations
batching of UDF operations might be possible to save the
overhead of UDFinv per tuple. While current DBMSs gen-
erally lack support for this optimization, our model could
be easily adapted to consider such cost amortizations.
12Optimizers might choose suboptimal plans when query
predicates are as complex as the guarded policy expressions.
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policy partitions (referred to as IndexGuards). In each of
the strategies, guarded expressions are used to generate rˆj
while access methods used may differ.
To determine cost of each strategy, SIEVE first runs the
EXPLAIN of query Qi which returns a high-level view of the
query plan including, usually, for each relation in the query
the particular access strategy (table scan or a specific in-
dex) the optimizer plans to use and estimated selectivity of
the predicate on that attribute (p). Then, SIEVE estimates
an upper bound of the cost for each strategy focusing on
the cost of accessing data. cost(IndexGuards) is computed
as
∑
Gi∈G ρ(Gi).cr, where ρ(Gi) is the cardinality of the
guard oc1g. If the optimizer selects to perform index scan
on a query predicate p, then cost(IndexQuery) = ρ(p).cr
otherwise cost(IndexQuery) =∞. SIEVE chooses between
IndexGuards and IndexQuery based on which strategy is
less costly. It then compares the better of the two strate-
gies to LinearScan choosing the latter if the random access
due to index scan is expected to be more costly than the se-
quential access of linear of scan. To implement the selected
strategy, SIEVE rewrites the query (including the appropri-
ate WITH clause(s) as explained in Section 5.3) to append: An
index hint (e.g., FORCE INDEX statement in MySQL) for each
guard Gi to the FROM clause within the WITH clause as we
showed previously (in the case of IndexGuards strategy);
or an index hint for the attribute of p (for IndexQuery); or
a hint to suggest the optimizer to igonore all indexes (e.g.,
USE INDEX() in MySQL) (for LinearScan).
5.6 Sample Query Rewriting in SIEVE
Let us consider the query in Section 2.1 to study the trade-
off between student performance and attendance to classes.
In that case, SIEVE might rewrite the query as follows de-
pending on the available policies and DBMS:
WITH WiFiDatasetPol AS (
SELECT * FROM WiFiDataset as W FORCE INDEX(oc1g · · · ocng )
WHERE (oc1g AND W.ts-date between "9/25/19" AND "
12/12/19" AND (oc11 AND · · · AND oc1n))
OR · · · OR
(ocng AND W.ts-date between "9/25/19" AND "
12/12/19" AND delta(32,"Prof.Smith", "
Analysis","owner","ts-date", "ts-time", "
wifiAP")=true)
) StudentPerf(WifiDatasetPol , Enrollment , Grades)
As the query has only one table with associated policies
in its FROM clauses (i.e., WiFiDataset table), the rewritten
query contains one WITH clause, generated as explained in
Section 5.3. This clause creates WiFiDatasetPol which is
now used in the original query to replace the WiFiDataset
table. The WITH clause includes the set of guards generated
for the querier (“Prof. Smith”) and his purpose (“Analysis”)
given the policies in the database. The query predicate on
date (ts-date between "9/25/19" AND "12/12/19") was in-
cluded along with each guard as outlined in Section 5.5. As
SIEVE selected the IndexGuards strategy, the WITH clause
forces the usage of guards as indexes (through the FORCE
INDEX command) as explained in Section 5.5. Finally, for
one specific guarded expression (Gn) SIEVE selected the
guard+ ∆ strategy (see Section 5.4). Hence, its policy par-
tition was replaced by the call to the UDF that implements
the ∆ operator. We point out that the implementation of
the general UDF presented in Section 5.2 has been modified
slightly to retrieve the policies on the partition of the guard
by using the id of the guard (passed as a parameter).
6. MANAGING DYNAMIC SCENARIOS
As mentioned before, the generation of guarded expres-
sions for a set of users can be performed offline. However,
in general, the dataset of access control policies defined for
a database can change along time (i.e., users add new poli-
cies or update existing ones). Hence, SIEVE would need to
regenerate guarded expressions to reflect the changes in the
policy dataset. The cost associated with guard generation is
a function of the number of policies and thus, in situations
with very large policy datasets, this cost might not be trivial.
Regenerating everytime that a change is made in the policy
dataset might not be thus optimal if no queries are executed
in between changes. Selecting the frequency of guard regen-
eration carefully can reduce the total system time. In this
section, we first extend the cost model presented earlier to
include the query evaluation time. Then, we derive the op-
timal number of policy insertions before guard regeneration
as a function of policy and query rates.
6.1 Query Evaluation with Guarded Expres-
sion
The cost of evaluating G associated with a uj is given by
cost(G) =
∑
Gi∈G
cost(Gi) (11)
Given Equation 3, and the simplifying assumption that
ρ(ocig) is the same for all the guards in G and can be repre-
sented by ρ(ocg), we can express the previous cost as∑
Gi∈G
cost(Gi)
=
∑
Gi∈G
ρ(ocig).(cr + ce.α.|PGi |)
= ρ(ocg).(cr + ce.α(|PG1 + PG2 + · · ·+ PGm |)
= ρ(ocg).(cr + ce.α.|Pn|) (12)
where |PG1 | + |PG2 | + · · · + |PGm | = |Pn| as every policy
is exactly covered by one guard. We now define the cost of
query evaluation for Qj (posed by uj) along with G (using
the IndexGuards approach presented in Section 5.3) as
cost(G,Qj) =
|G|∑
i=1
cost(Gi) + ρ(G).eval(E(Qj), tt) (13)
where ρ(G) is the cardinality of the guarded expression for
uj (i.e., the number of tuples that satisfy G and are then
checked against the Qj posed by uj). We expand this cost
using Equation 12 and substitute ρ(G) with ρ(ocg) which
gives an upper bound of the cost as ρ(ocg) > ρ(G).
cost(G,Qj) = ρ(ocg).(cr + ce.α.(|Pn|+ |Qj |) (14)
6.2 Computing Optimal Regeneration Rate
SIEVE will be able to cut the total cost for a querier
which includes query evaluation and guard generation fol-
lowing the optimal regeneration rate. The cost of generat-
ing the guarded expression is proportional to the number
of policies for the querier (Pn). Assuming k policies be-
longing to the querier are newly added since the guard (G)
was last generated, we denote cost of guard generation by
10
CG(Pn +Pk). Given D and uj with N policy insertions and
Q queries posed by uj , the optimal number of policy inser-
tions (k˜) before regenerating the guarded expression for uj
is given by
k˜ = argmin
k≤N
N
k∑
i=1
(cost(G,Qf(k),Pk) + CG(Pn + Pk)) (15)
We divide that the total number of policies (N) into equal
intervals of size k. To simplify the derivation, we assume
that queries are uniform and the number of queries posed
by the querier during that interval is given by f(k). We de-
fine f(k) based on rp which is the rate at which new policies
are added (number of policies per unit time) and rq which is
the rate at which queries are posed by uj to D. We combine
both to define rpq as the number of queries posed per policy
insertion (
rq
rp
) 13. The number of queries during each inter-
val of
N
k
is given by f(k) = (j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k ∗ rpq. Finally,
we simplify the guard generation cost as a constant (CG) as
it is dominated by the much larger Pn. Putting all these
together we have:
k˜ = argmin
k≤N
N
k∑
i=1
(k∗rqp∑
j=1
cost(G,Qj ,Pk) + CG
)
(16)
Expanding the first cost term with the cost of query eval-
uation from Equation 14 for insertion of k policies with the
assumption that all queries are uniform and
ρ(ocP1 ∪ ocP2 · · · ∪ ocPk ) ⊆ ρ(ocG)
cost(G,Qj ,Pk)
= rpq.ρ(ocG).(cr + α.ce.(|Pn|+ |Q|))
+ rpq.ρ(ocG).(cr + α.ce.(|Pn|+ 1 + |Q|))
+ · · ·
+ rpq.ρ(ocG).(cr + α.ce.(|Pn|+ k + |Q|))
= k.rpq.ρ(ocG).cr
+ rpq.ρ(ocG).ce.α.(k.|Q|+ k.|Pn|+ k.(k − 1)
2
) (17)
Using this equation in the previous minimization and re-
placing the summations with uniformity assumptions, the k˜
is given by
k˜ = argmin
k≤N
N
k
.
(
k.rpq.ρ(ocG). (18)
(cr + ce.α.(|Q|+ |Pn|+ (k − 1)
2
))
)
As our goal is to find the minimal k, we take the derivative
of the above with respect to k and set it equal to 0.
ρ(ocG).α.ce.rpq
2
− 2.CG
k2
= 0
13We assume that D remains static which is only true for
OLAP queries. Monitoring data insertion rate for each user
will incur a significant overhead that will invalidate the use-
fulness of this approach.
Simplifying it for k, we have
k =
√
4.CG
ρ(ocG).α.ce.rpq
(19)
The second derivative with respect to k is a positive value
and therefore the k value derived by Equation 19 minimizes
the cost of query evaluation and guard generation for uj .
Based on the simplifying assumptions used in this deriva-
tion, k˜ is an upper bound on the number of policy inser-
tions before the guarded expression is updated. We now
prove when it is most beneficial to regenerate the guarded
expression after the insertion of kth policy.
Theorem 2. If the optimal rate of guard regeneration is
set to k policies as in Equation 19, then it is best to regen-
erate immediately after the kth policy has arrived.
We prove this by contradiction. Assuming the guard re-
generation rate is set to k policies for a querier and we re-
generate G at k + δ. If δ >
1
rp
, then regeneration rate is set
at k + 1 and not k which is a contradiction. If δ >
1
rq
, then
the new query will be evaluated using G and the set of k
policies which is higher compared to using the regenerated
guarded expression as shown in the derivation above. There-
fore δ <
1
rp
and δ <
1
rq
and thus regenerating immediately
after kth policy will minimize the cost.
7. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
7.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We used the TIPPERS dataset [29] consisting
of connectivity logs generated by the 64 WiFi Access Points
(APs) at the Computer Science building at UC Irvine for a
period of three months. These logs are generated when a
WiFi enabled device (e.g., a smartphone or tablet) connects
to one of the WiFi APs and contain the hashed identification
of the device’s MAC, the AP’s MAC, and a timestamp. The
dataset comprises 3.9M events corresponding to 36K differ-
ent devices (the signal of some of the WiFi APs bleeds to
outside the building and passerby devices/people are also
observed). This information can be used to derive the oc-
cupancy levels in different parts of the building and to pro-
vide diverse location-based services (see Section 2.1) based
on since device MACs can be used to identify individuals.
Since location information is privacy-sensitive, it is essential
to limit access to this data based on individuals’ preferences.
Table 2 shows the schema of the different tables in the TIP-
PERS dataset. WiFi Dataset stores the logs generated at
each WiFi AP when the devices of a User connects to them.
User Group and User Group Membership keeps track of the
groups and their members respectively.
We also used a synthetic dataset containing WiFi connec-
tivity events in a shopping mall for scalability experiments
with even larger number of policies. We refer to this dataset
as Mall. We generated the Mall dataset using the IoT data
generation tool in [19] to generate synthetic trajectories of
people in a space (we used the floorplan of a mall extracted
from the Web) and sensor data based on those. The dataset
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Table 2: TIPPERS data schema.
Table Columns Data type
Users
id int
device varchar
office int
User Groups
id int
name varchar
owner varchar
User Group Membership
user group id int
user id int
Location
id int
name varchar
type varchar
WiFi Dataset
id int
wifiAP int
owner int
ts-time time
ts-date date
contains 1.7M events from 2,651 different devices represent-
ing customers. Table 3 shows the schema of the tables in
the Mall dataset.
Table 3: Mall data schema.
Table Columns Data type
Users
id int
device varchar
interest varchar
Shop
id int
name varchar
type varchar
WiFi Connectivity
id int
shop id int
owner int
obs time time
obs date date
Queries. We used a set of query templates based on the
recent IoT SmartBench benchmark [19] which include a mix
of analytical and real-time tasks and target queries about
(group of) individuals. Specifically, query templates Q1 -
Retrieve the devices connected for a list of locations during
a time period (e.g., for location surveillance); Q2 - Retrieve
devices connected for a list of given MAC addresses during
a time period (e.g., for device surveillance); Q3 - Number of
devices from a group or profile of users in a given location
(e.g., for analytic purposes). The SQL version of the queries
is thus:
Q1=( SELECT * FROM WiFi_Dataset AS W
WHERE W.wifiAP IN ([ap]) W.ts -time BETWEEN t1 AND
t2 AND W.ts-date BETWEEN d1 AND d2)
Q2=( SELECT * FROM WiFi_Dataset AS W
WHERE W.owner in ([devices]) AND W.ts -time BETWEEN
t1 AND t2 AND W.ts -date BETWEEN d1 AND d2)
Q3=( SELECT * FROM WiFi_Dataset AS W,
User_Group_Membership AS UG
WHERE UG.user_group_id = group− id
AND UG.user_id = W.owner AND W.ts-time BETWEEN t1
AND t2 AND W.ts-date BETWEEN d1 AND d2)
Based on these templates, we generated queries at three
different selectivities (low, medium, high) by modifying con-
figuration parameters (locations, users, time periods). Be-
low, when we refer to a particular query type (i.e., Q1, Q2,
or Q3) we will refer to the set of queries generated for such
type.
Policy Generation. The TIPPERS dataset, collected for
a limited duration with special permission from the Univer-
sity for the purpose of research, does not include user-defined
policies. We therefore generated a set of synthetic policies.
As part of the TIPPERS project, we conducted several town
hall meetings and online surveys to understand the privacy
preferences of users about sharing their WiFi-based location
data. The surveys, as well as prior research [25, 27], indicate
that users express their privacy preferences based on differ-
ent user profiles (e.g., students for faculty) or groups (e.g.,
my coworkers, classmates, friends, etc.). Thus, we used a
profile-based approach to generate policies specifying which
events belonging to individual can be accessed by a given
querier (based on their profile) for a specific purpose in a
given context (e.g., location, time).
We classified devices in the TIPPERS dataset as belong-
ing to users with different profiles (denoted by profile(uk)
for User uk) based on the total time spent in the building
and connectivity patterns. Devices which rarely connect to
APs in the building (i.e., less than 5% of the days) are clas-
sified as visitors. The non-visitor devices are then classified
based on the type of rooms they spent most time in: staff
(staff offices), undergraduate students (classrooms), gradu-
ate students (labs), and faculty (professor offices). As a
result, we classified 31,796 visitors, 1,029 staff, 388 faculty,
1,795 undergraduate, and 1,428 graduate from a total of
36,436 unique devices in the dataset. Our classification is
consistent with the expected numbers for the population of
the monitored building. We also grouped users into groups
based on the affinity of their devices to rooms in the building
which is defined in terms of time spent in each region per
day. Thus, each device is assigned to a group with maximum
affinity. In total, we generated 56 groups with an average of
108 devices per group.
We define two kinds of policies based on whether they
are an unconcerned user or an advanced user as described
in Section 2.1. Unconcerned users subscribe to the default
policies set by administrator which allows access to their
data based on user-groups and profiles. Given the schema
in Table 2 and the unconcerned user uk we generate the
following default policies:
• Data associated with uk collected during working hours
can be accessed by members of group(uk).
• Data associated with uk collected at any time can be ac-
cessed by overlapping members of group(uk) and profile(uk).
On the other hand, an advanced user define on average
40 policies, given the large number of control options (such
as device, time, groups, profiles, and locations) in our set-
ting. In total, the policy dataset generated contains 869,470
policies with each individual defining 472 policies on average
and appearing as querier in 188 policies defined by others
on average. The above policies are defined to allow access
to data in different situations. Any other access that is not
captured by the previous policies will be denied (based on
the default opt-out semantics defined in Section 3.1).
Table 4 shows the schema and several sample policies gen-
erated for three different queriers. The inserted at and ac-
tion columns are skipped for brevity. Table 5 shows the
corresponding object conditions which are part of two poli-
cies.
Table 4: Policy Table
id table querier purpose
1 WiFi Dataset Prof.John Smith Attendance
2 WiFi Dataset Bob Belcher Lunch Group
3 WiFi Dataset Prof.John Smith Attendance
4 WiFi Dataset Liz Lemon Project Group
5 WiFi Dataset Prof.John Smith Attendance
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Table 5: Policy Object Conditions Table
id policy id attr type attr op val
1 1 int owner = 120
2 1 time ts-time ≥ 09:00:00
3 1 time ts-time ≤ 10:00:00
4 1 int wifiAP = 1200
5 2 int owner = 145
6 2 int wifiAP = 2300
For the Mall dataset, the shops were categorized into
six types based on the services they provide, e.g., arcade,
movies, etc. We also classified customers into regular and
irregular, based on their shop visits. For each customer,
we then defined two types of policies depending on whether
they were regular or irregular. Regular customers allowed
shops they visit the most to have access to their location
during open hours. On the other hand, irregular customers
shared their data only with specific shop types depending
on if there were sales or discounts. Finally, if a customer
expressed an interest in a particular shop category, we also
generated policies which allowed access of their data to the
shops in the category for a short period of time (e.g., light-
ning sales). In total, this policy dataset generated on top of
Mall dataset contains in 19,364 policies defined for 35 shops
(queriers) in the mall with 551 policies on average per shop.
Database System. We ran the experiments on an indi-
vidual machine (CentOS 7.6, Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-
4640, 2799.902 Mhz, 20480 KB cache size) in a cluster with
a shared total memory of 132 GB. We performed experi-
ments on MySQL 8.0.3 with InnoDB as it is an open source
DBMS which supports index usage hints. We configured the
buffer pool size to 4 GB. We also performed experiments on
PostgreSQL 13.0 with shared buffers configured to 4 GB.
7.2 Experimental Results
We first study the speed and quality of guarded expression
generation algorithm for the policy dataset generated based
on TIPPERS (Experiment 1). Secondly, we performed ex-
periments to validate the design choices in SIEVE (Exper-
iment 2) as well as compare the performance of SIEVE
against the baselines (Experiment 3). Fourth, we tested
SIEVE on PostgreSQL which does not support index usage
hints and is therefore different from MySQL on which all
the previous experiments were run (Experiment 4). In the
final experiment, we stress test our approach with a very
large number of policies (Experiment 5). The first four ex-
periments were done on TIPPERS and the final experiment
was done on Mall dataset.
Figure 2: Guard generation cost.
Experiment 1: Cost
for generating Guarded
Expressions and Ef-
fectiveness. The goal
of this experiment is to
study the cost of generat-
ing guarded expressions
for a querier as factor
of the number of policies
and the quality of generated guards. For analyzing the cost
of guarded expression generation, we generate guarded ex-
pressions for all the users using the algorithm described in
Section 4 and collect the generation times in a set. We
sort these costs (in milliseconds) of generating guarded ex-
pressions for different users and average the value for every
group of 50 users showing the result in Figure 2. The cost
of guard generation increases linearly with number of poli-
cies. As guarded expression generation is also dependent on
the selectivity of policies, number of candidate guards gen-
erated, which is also a factor of overlap between predicates,
we sometimes observe a slight decrease in the time taken
with increasing policies. The overhead of the cost of gener-
ating guarded expression is minimal, for instance, the cost
of generating a guard for a querier with 160 policies associ-
ated (e.g., the student trying to locate classmates explained
in Section 2.1) is around 150ms.
min avg max SD
|pu
k
| 31 187 359 38
|G| 2 31 60 10
|pG
i
| 4 7 60 5
ρ(Gi) 0.01% 3% 24% 2%
Savings 0.99 0.99 1 7e−4
Table 6: Analysis of policies and
generated guards.
ρ(G)
|G|
low high
low 227.2 537.0
high 469.0 1,406.7
Table 7: Analysis of num-
ber of guards and total
cardinality.
We present the results of analyzing the policies and guarded
expressions in Table 6. Each user on average have defined
187 policies (|pu
k
|). This number of policies depends on their
profiles (e.g., student) and group memberships. SIEVE cre-
ates an average of 31 guards per user with the mean partition
cardinality (i.e., |pGi |) as 7. The total cardinality of guards
in the guarded expression is low (i.e., ρ(Gi)) which helps in
filtering out tuples before performing policy evaluation. In
cases with high cardinality guards (e.g., maximum of 24%),
SIEVE will not use force an index scan in that particular
guard as explained in Section 5. Savings is computed as
ratio of the difference between total number of policy eval-
uations without and with using the guard and the number
of policy evaluations. This was computed on a smaller sam-
ple of the entire dataset and the results show guards help
in eliminating around 99% of the policy checks compared to
policy evaluation.
Experiment 2.1: Inline vs. Operator ∆. SIEVE uses a
cost model to determine for each guard whether to inline the
policies or to evaluate the policies using the ∆ operator. The
∆ operator has an associated overhead of UDF invocation
but it can utilize the tuple context to reduce the number of
policies that needs to be checked per tuple. For the purpose
of studying this tradeoff in both inlining and using the ∆
operator, we gradually increased the number of policies that
are part of the partition of a guard and observed the cost of
policy evaluation. As expected, we observed that when the
number of policies are about 120, the cost of UDF invoca-
tions is amortized by the savings from filtering policies by
the ∆ operator (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Inlining vs. ∆. Figure 4: Index choice.
Experiment 2.2: Query Index vs. Guard Index. In
SIEVE, we use a cost model to choose between using the
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IndexQuery and IndexGuards as explained in Section 5. We
evaluated this cost model by analyzing the cost of evalua-
tion against increasing query cardinality for three different
guard cardinalities (low, medium, high). Figure 4 shows
the results averaged across these three guard cardinalities.
As expected, at low query cardinality it is better to utilize
IndexQuery, while at medium and high query cardinalities
(> 0.07), IndexGuards are the better choice. Note that in
both these options, guarded expressions are used as filter on
top of the results from Index Scan.
Experiment 3: Query Evaluation Performance. We
compare the performance of SIEVE (implemented as de-
tailed in Section 5) against three different baselines. In the
first baseline, BaselineP , we append the policies that apply
to the querier to the WHERE condition of the query. Second,
BaselineI , performs an index scan per policy (forced using
index usage hints) and combines the results using the UNION
. Third, BaselineU is similar to BaselineP but instead of
using the policy expression, it uses a UDF defined on the
relation to evaluate the policies. The UDF takes as input
all the attributes of the tuple. BaselineU reduces signifi-
cantly the number of policies to be evaluated per tuple and is
therefore an interesting optimization strategy for low cardi-
nality queries. UDF invocations are expensive, therefore so
it might be preferable to execute the UDF as late as possible
from the optimization perspective [20]. To preserve correct-
ness of policy enforcement as defined in Section 3.1, UDF
operations have to be performed before any non-monotonic
query operations.
For each of the query types (Q1, Q2, Q3), we generate
a workload of queries with three different selectivity classes
posed by five different queriers of belonging to four differ-
ent profiles. The values chosen for these three selectivity
classes (low, medium, high) differed depending upon the
query type. We execute each query along with the access
control mechanism 5 times and average the execution times.
The experimental results below give the average warm per-
formance per query. The time out was set at 30 seconds. If
a strategy timed out for all queries of that group we show
the value TO. If a strategy timed out for some of the queries
in a group but not all, the table shows the average perfor-
mance only for those queries that were executed to comple-
tion; those time values are denoted as t+.
Table 8: Overall comparison of performance for Q1, Q2, and Q3
(in ms).
ρ(Q) BaselineP BaselineI BaselineU SIEVE
Q1
low 1,668 906 9,122 418
mid 15,356 910 23,575+ 453
high TO 937 TO 523
Q2
low 860 916 7,787 407
mid 7,191 922 22,617+ 454
high 29,765+ 962 TO 475
Q3
low 883 881 14,379 477
mid 2,217 2,209 TO 476
high 3,502 3,543 TO 521
Table 8 shows the average performance for the three query
types. Performance of BaselineP and BaselineU degrades
with increasing cardinality of the associated query as they
rely on the query predicate for reading the tuples. The rela-
tive reduction in overhead for Q3 for BaselineP at high car-
dinalities is because the optimizer is able to use the low car-
dinality join condition to perform a nested index loop join.
SIEVE and BaselineIperformance stays the same across
query cardinalities as they utilize the policy and guard pred-
icates for reading the tuples and is therefore not affected by
the query cardinality. The increase in the speedup between
these two sets of approaches clearly demonstrate that ex-
ploiting indices paid off. For BaselineP , the optimizer is
not able to exploit indices at high cardinalities and resorts
to performing linear scan. In BaselineU , the cost of UDF
invocation per tuple far outweighed any benefits from fil-
tering of policies. BaselineI generated by careful rewriting
with an index scan per policy, performs significantly better
than the previous two baselines. The performance degrade
of BaselineI for Q3 is due to the optimizer preferring to
perform the nested loop join first instead of the index scans.
In comparison to all these baselines, SIEVE is significantly
faster at all different query cardinalities.
The extended results for Q1, Q2, and Q3 by querier pro-
file (F-Faculty, G-Graduate, U-Undergrad, and S-Staff are
shown in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11, respectively.
Table 9: Comparison of performance for Q1 (in ms).
Pr. ρ(Q) BaselineP BaselineI BaselineU SIEVE
F
l 1,560 972 9,398 357
m 14,533 949 23,362+ 352
h TO 962 TO 413
G
l 1,794 998 9,573 426
m 16,737 994 23,735+ 495
h TO 990 TO 565
U
l 1,618 681 9,661 362
m 15,432 751 23,692+ 394
h TO 720 TO 422
S
l 1,701 975 7,854 526
m 14,722 946 23,511+ 571
h TO 1,077 TO 691
Table 10: Comparison of performance (in ms) for Q2.
Pr. ρ(Q) BaselineP BaselineI BaselineU SIEVE
F
l 822 961 7,655 354
m 6,929 975 22,502+ 354
h 26,397 991 TO 362
G
l 947 1,009 8,084 404
m 7,806 1,028 22,676+ 506
h TO 1,080 TO 537
U
l 848 739 8,336 380
m 7,156 725 22,863+ 368
h TO 769 TO 399
S
l 822 954 7,073 489
m 6,874 960 22,425+ 589
h 28,347 1,007 TO 603
Table 11: Comparison of performance (in ms) for Q3.
Pr. ρ(Q) BaselineP BaselineI BaselineU SIEVE
F
l 892 871 14,279 372
m 2,302 2,248 TO 379
h 3,595 3,662 TO 405
G
l 893 886 13,287 524
m 2,183 2,200 TO 518
h 3,486 3,487 TO 568
U
l 881 884 10,601 619
m 2,174 2,200 TO 613
h 3,512 3,446 TO 668
S
l 865 885 11,947 319
m 2,211 2,188 TO 392
h 3,512 3,576 TO 444
Figure 5: SIEVE on MySQL
and PostgreSQL.
Figure 6: Scalability compari-
son.
Experiment 4: SIEVE on PostgreSQL. In the previous
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experiments we used MySQL, which supports hints for index
usage, thus enabling SIEVE to explicitly force the optimizer
to choose guard indexes. However, other DBMSs, such as
PostgreSQL, do not support index usage hints explicitly (as
discussed in Section 5.3). To study SIEVE’s performance in
such systems, we implemented a SIEVE connector to Post-
greSQL using the same rewrite strategy but without index
usage hints. In order to have a cumulative set of policies
(i.e., the larger set of policies contain the smaller set of poli-
cies) for evaluation, we chose 5 queriers with at least 300
policies in the dataset. For each querier, we divided their
policies into 10 different sets of increasing number of poli-
cies starting with smallest set of 75 policies. The order and
the specific policies in these sets were varied 3 times by ran-
dom sampling. The results in Figure 5 shows the average
performance of different strategies for each set size averaged
across queriers and the samples for SELECT ALL queries.
The four strategies tested in this experiment are: best per-
forming baseline for MySQL (BaselineI(M)) from Experi-
ment 3, the baseline in PostgreSQL (BaselineP (P)), and
SIEVE in both MySQL and PostgreSQL (SIEVE (M) and
SIEVE (P)). The results show that not only SIEVE out-
performs the baseline in PostgreSQL but also the speedup
factor w.r.t. the baseline is even higher than in MySQL. Ad-
ditionally, the speedup factor in PostgreSQL is the highest
at largest number of policies. Based on our analysis of the
query plan chosen by PostgreSQL, it correctly chooses the
guards for performing index scans (as intended by SIEVE)
even without the index usage hints. In addition, PostgreSQL
supports combining multiple index scans by preparing a
bitmap in memory14. It used these bitmaps to OR the re-
sults from the guards whenever it was possible, and the only
resultant table rows are visited and obtained from the disk.
With a larger number of guards (for larger number of poli-
cies), PostgreSQL was also able to more efficiently filter out
tuples compared to using the policies. Thus, SIEVE benefits
from reduced number of disk reads (due to bitmap) as well
as a smaller number of evaluations against the partition of
the guarded expression.
Experiment 5: Scalability. The previous experiment
shows that the speedup of SIEVE w.r.t. the baselines in-
creases with an increasing number of policies, especially for
PostgreSQL. We explore this aspect further on PostgreSQL
using the Mall dataset where the generation of very large
number of policies is more feasible as we can simulate more
customers. We used the same process than in Experiment 4
to generate cumulative set of policies by choosing 5 querier-
s/shops with at least 1,200 policies defined for them. Fig-
ure 6 reaffirms how the speedup of SIEVE compared against
the baseline increases linearly starting from a factor of 1.6
for 100 policies to a factor of 5.6 for 1,200 policies. We ana-
lyzed the query plan selected by the optimizer for the SIEVE
rewritten queries. We observed that with larger number of
guards, PostgreSQL is able to utilize the bitmaps in mem-
ory to gain additional speedups from guarded expressions
(as explained in Experiment 4). Also, this experiment shows
that SIEVE outperforms the baseline for a different dataset
which shows the generality of our approach.
8. CONCLUSION
14https://www.postgresql.org/docs/12/
indexes-bitmap-scans.html
In this paper, we presented SIEVE, a layered approach to
enforcing large number of fine-grained policies during query
execution. SIEVE combines two optimizations: reducing
the number of policies that need to be checked against each
tuple, and reducing the number of tuples that need to be
checked against complex policy expressions. SIEVE is de-
signed as a general purpose middleware approach and we
have layered it on two different DBMSs. The experimental
evaluation, using a real dataset and a synthetic one, high-
lights that SIEVE enables existing DBMSs to perform ef-
ficient access control. SIEVE significantly outperforms ex-
isting strategies for implementing policies based on query
rewrite. The speedup factor increases with increasing num-
ber of policies and SIEVE’s query processing time remains
low even for thousands of policies per query.
We plan to leverage the experience gained while develop-
ing SIEVE to pursue a tighter integration with the database
query optimizer. Also, we plan to study possible mecha-
nisms to combine certain amount of preprocessing at inser-
tion time to simplify policy checking and guard evaluation
at query time to extend SIEVE to co-optimize a query and
policy workload.
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